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"Yhis is true liberty whenfree-born man,
Having to advise the peblic, may speak free;
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise,
Who neither can nor will may hold his peace.
What can bejuster in a State than this?"
Euroides-
--
P The Szttliants."
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN GENERAL AND OF PRIVILEGED
PUBLICATION.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the law governing
the right of criticism and fair comment, it will be necessary to
consider briefly some of the general principles of the law of
defamation in general, and of privileged publications in par-
ticular.
Defamation may be described to be the publication of
matter, by speech or by writing, injurious to the good fame and
reputation of another.
Written defamation is called libel, and spoken defama-
tion slander, but for reasons, (the soundness of which may be
doubted), the law has made a great difference between the two
and the consequences attendant upon each.
Thus while the only remedy for slander is a civil suit for
damages for injury to the reputation of the plaintiff, libel is a
criminal as well as a civil wrong, and both civil and criminal
remedies may be pursued at the same time, neither one being
a bar to the other.
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Slander is only actionable when the plaintiff can show
special damage to himself as the natural and probable result
of the words spoken-except in certain cases which need not
be enumerated here, where the charge against the plaintiff is
of so serious a nature that special damage will be presumed
and need not be proved.
Written words are libellous as against. any person whom
they tend to bring into hatred, contempt or ridicule.
Thus words may be spoken and no action lie for their
publication, which, if written, would be the subject of a crim-
inal indictment, and many spoken words whiclh are not action-
able, unless special damage be proved, become so if they are
written.
It will be unnecessary, however, to discuss here at length
the differences between the law of libel and that of slander, or
to consider at all the rules applicable to the former when
viewed as a crime, and hereafter the principles laid down as
applicable to libel may be considered as applicable to slander
also, unless the contrary be stated.
The declaration in actions for libel always sets out that
the defendant did "falsely and maliciously, etc., etc.," but it is
not necessary for the plaintiff to establish in the first instance
either the falsity or the malice of the words. It is only incum-
bent upon him to prove that the expressions used are defam-
atory, and that they were published by the defendant, and if
the defendant wishes to rely upon the truth of the matter stated
as a justification, he must plead it specially. This defense of
"truth" has been universally recognized as a complete answer
to an action for damages, only one or two very early cases
questioning its soundness, and it is so recognized, not because
of any merit on the part of the defendant, who may have been
actuated by spite and malice, but because of the demerit
attaching to the plaintiff, for as the damages are given because
of the injury to the reputation, it follows that if the words are
true no damage should be given, or, as Judge LITTLEDALE
puts it, " The law will not permit a man to recover damages
in respect of an injury to a character which he either does not
or ought not to possess." (McPlierson v. Daniels, io B. & C.
272.)
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Thus it is that this defence, when set up, must be specially
pleaded, for in relying on it the defendant admits the cause of
action, that is, the publication of the defamatory words, but
avoids it by showing that the plaintiff has sustained no injury
to his reputation. In accordance with this view, the plea of
truth is no defence to an indictment for libel, because that is
prosecutable, not for the satisfaction of the person attacked,
but for the safety of the public, because the publication has a
tendency to promote a breach of the peace. The law on this
subject is, however, altered in England, and in some of our
States, by statute, and truth may be set up as a defence to a
criminal indictment for libel.
If the defence of truth is not set up and the defendant
simply pleads the general issue, the plaintiff, having proved
the publication of the words by the defendant, and the fact
that they are defamatory, can rest his case and need give no
evidence of malice.
The use of the word malice in this connection is an
unfortunate one, and has properly been condemned by both,
Judges and text-writers (Abbatl v. Northeastern Railway Co.,
ii Appeal Cas. 253; Botterill v. Whzytehead, 41 Law Times,
590; Odgers on Libel and Slander, pp. 27o and 271), for, as
the layman understands the term, it presupposes a motive or
intention, but the intention of the publisher of a libel is
ordinarily immaterial. It is only in the case of privileged
publications, to be noticed presently, that the intention becomes
material, and in the present connection malice means nothing
more nor less than absence of just excuse. As, therefore,
some distinction is necessary between the cases where the
word is used as signifying a wrong intention, and those when
it has no such signification, the latter are termed cases of
implied malice, or malice in law, and the former express malice,
or malice in fact.
The law implies malice, as it is said, because it is pre-
sumed that every man knows the ordinary meaning of the
words he uses, and the construction that will be put upon
them by those who read them, and if the jury, putting them-
selves in the position of the reader, decide that the words are
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defamatory, the one who published them must bear the
consequences.
The tendency of the publication, not the intention of the
publisher, forms the true test. Indeed, the motive of the
publisher may be most praiseworthy, yet if his words are
defamatory an action will lie against him. The law on the
subject is well summed up by HOLT as follows:
"It is urged that the motive of many publications which
the law deems to be libels may be innocent, and even laudable,
and that without the proof of malice, or what is equivalent to
malice, the mere act of publishing or com3osing a libel ought
not to be the subject of punishment. 'this objection only
becomes specious from the misapprehension of the term
malice. Malice, in legal understanding, implies no more than
wilfulness. The first inquiry of a civil judicature, if the fact
do not speak for itself as a maur zn se, is to find out whether
it be wilfully committed; it searches not into the intention or
motive any further or otherwise than as they are marks of a vol-
untary act; and having found it so, it concerns itself no more
with a man's design or principle of acting, but punishes without
scruple what manifestly to the offender himself was a breach of
the command of the legislature. The law collects the intention
from the act itself; the act being in itself unlawful an evil
intent is inferred, and needs no proof by extrinsic evidence.
That michief which a man does he is supposed to mean, and
he is not permitted to put in issue a meaning abstracted from
the fact.
"The crime consists in publishing a libel; a criminal
intention in the writer is no part of the definition of the crime
of libel at common law. ' He who scattereth firebrands,
arrows and death [which, if not an accurate definition, is a
very intelligent description of a libel], is ea ratzone a criminal.'
It is not incumbent on the prosecutor to prove his intent;
and on his part he shall not be heard to say, 'Am I not in
sport?'" Holt on Libel, Chapter III, p. 55.
Malice then is presumed, in all cases of libel, from the fact
that the words used are defamatory, but this presumption may
be rebutted by showing that the words were uttered on a
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privileged occasion, and if this can be established, the plaintiff
is bound to prove express malice before he can recover.
It would be impossible, within the limits of this brief
article, to enter into any minute discussion of the endless
phases of this question of privilege which have arisen and are
arising every day, but it is necessary to give some rough out-
line of its character, in order to fully understand the principles
applicable to the right of criticism and comment, which we
will discuss hereafter. We will confine ourselves to a discus-
sion of qualified privilege as the cases of absolute privilege
are not akin to our subject.
Mr. Townshend lays down the rule governing privileged
publications as follows:
"The rule as to privilege is that one may publish by
speech or writing whatever he honestly believes is essential
to the protection of his own rights, or to the rights of another,
provided the publication be not unnecessarily made to others,
than to those persons whom the publisher honestly believes
can assist him in the protection of his own rights, nor to
others than those whom he honestly believes will, by reason
of a knowledge of the matter published, be better enabled to
assert, or to protect from invasion, either their own rights, or
the rights of others entrusted to their guardianship." Town-
shend on Libel and Slande-r, 4 th edition, Sec. 209, page 301.
Judge BLACKBURN says: "Where a person is so situated
that it becomes right in the interest of society that he should
tell to a third person certain facts, then if he bona fide, and
without malice, does tell them it is a privileged communi-
cation." Davies v. Sneed, L. R. 5, Q. B. 61I, and this defini-
tion is approved by Judge BRETT. (Waller v. Locke, L. R. 7,
Q. B. 622). But of all the many definitions the one which is
most widely cited, and approved, is that propounded by
counsel, and adopted by Lord Campbell as follows: "A com-
munication made bonafide, upon any subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having
a correspondence interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter, which, without this privilege, would be
slanderous and actionable; and 'duty' in the proposed canon
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cannot be confined to legal duties which may be enforced by
indictment, action or mandamus, but must include moral and
social duties of imperfect obligation." Harrison v. Bus/, 5
Ellis and Blackburn, 344.
This latter, however, does not seem to cover the ground
so completely as the rule propounded by Mr. Townshend,
although that may appear, at first sight, to conflict with some
of the decided cases, and the rules laid down by text Writers,
in that it does not add the word "reasonably" to "honestly."
For Odgers, in discussing privileged publications, speaks of
cases "where circumstances exist, or are reasonably believed
by the defendant to exist, which cast upon him the duty of
making such a publication." And in Pennsylvania the rule
of privilege as laid down is that "a communication to be
privileged must be made upon a proper occasion, from a
proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or prob-
able cause." Briggs v. Garrett, I I I P. St., 404; Press Co. v.
Stewart, I19 Pa., St. 584.
On the other hand, an apparently opposite rule is laid
down in the case of Clark v. Molyneux, (3 Q. B. D. 237). In
that case the Judge, in charging the jury, said in effect that
the question for them to consider was whether the defendant
honestly believed the charges he had made against the plaintiff,
and "honest belief" of necessity imported in its meaning that
he had good grounds for believing them. On appeal, this
charge was reversed, and the principle laid down that the
defendant might honestly believe a thing and be protected
by the privilege, although he had no reasonable ground for
his belief.
This apparent inconsistency arises because of the con-
fusion between the two uses of the word "reasonable." It may
mean reasonable in the eyes of the person who published
the defamatory words, or it may mean reasonable in the eyes
of an ordinary man-that is of the jury.
It is in the latter sense that the word is used in Clark v.
Molyne ix, 3 Q. B. D. 237, while the former meaning must be
the one intended by Mr. Odgers, and by Judge PAXSON in
Briggs v. Garrett, I I I Pa. St. 404, and Press Co. v. Stewart,
119 Pa. St. 584, ualess we are to consider those cases as de-
AND FAIR COMMENT.
parting from all previous precedent. The question to be put
to the jury is not " Do you consider the defendant's belief a
reasonable one?" but rather " Could any fair-minded and sen-
sible man have believed what the defendant asserts that he
believed?" They might consider his belief as an illogical
inference, in their opinion, from the facts on which he grounded
it, and yet be perfectly justified in bringing in a verdict for him,
but if they found it to be so utterly unreasonable and ground-
less that, in their opinion, no sensible man could have held it,
that fact would be evidence to show that his belief was not an
honest one, and would justify them in finding a verdict for the
plaintiff.
It follows, therefore, that Mr. Townshend is right in saying
that honest belief is sufficient to entitle the defendant to the
privilege, for if we construe reasonable to mean reasonable in
the eyes of the publisher, that meaning is necessarily included
in the meaning of the word honest, for a man cannot honestly
believe a thing unless his belief also appears to him to be
founded upon reasonable grounds; while if we construe it in the
other sense, which may be ascribed to it, then Clark v. Holy-
neux, 3 Q. B. D. 237, is authority for the proposition that it is
unnecessary.
Another point in which Mr. Townshend's definition is
preferable to the others, is that it brings out more clearly the
reason for this privilege, by showing that it is based upon the
existence of certain rights, or their reciprocal duties.
"There is no such thing," he says, "as a duty of imiperfect
obligation, what is so denominated is really a right which, as
in the case of all rights, the person in whom it is vested may
or may not exercise at his option."-Townstend on Slander
and Libel, p. 27, Sec. 3, 4 th edition.
To frame a definition which would cover all these rights
would be impossible; all that we can say is that under a given
state of circumstances, an act is a permitted one, one which
the actor has a right to do, or that it is an unpermitted one,
one which the actor has no right to do. And the occasions
when a man is justified in publishing statements, even though
they be defamatory, in the exercise of his rights, may be
roughly described as those which arise when a man's own
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interests, or the interests of society at large are to be preserved,
or when the interests of his fellow man are at stake, and a duty
is cast upon him to protect them in so far as he is able.
The most complete classification of the occasions where
there is a qualified privilege attaching to the publication of
defamatory matter, is that made by Mr. Odgers, and followed
by Mr. Newell.-Odgers on Libel and Slander, p. 199; Newell
on Defamation, Slander and Libel, p. 476, etc., as follows:
I. Where circumstances exist, or are reasonably believed
by the defendant to exist, which cast upon him the duty of
making a communication to a certain other person, to whom
he makes such communication, in the bona fide performance of
such duty.
These communications may be made (A) in pursuance of
a duty owed to society, or (B) in pursuance of a duty owed to
his family or himself.
The cases included under (A) are enumerated as (I). Cha-
racters of servants.
(2). Other confidential communications of a private na-
ture.
(3). Information as to crime or misconduct of others,
including charges against public officials.
The cases included under (B) are enumerated as (I): State-
ments necessary to protect the defendant's private interests.
(2). Statements provoked or invited by previous words or.
acts of the plaintiff.
II. Where the defendant has an interest in the subject-
matter of the communication, and the person to whon the
communication is made has a corresponding interest.
This common interest is generally a pecuniary one, but
may be also one arising in the joint exercise of any legal right,
and under this head Mr. Newell classifies cases of defamatory
charges preferred against candidates for public offices.
III. Fair reports of
(I). Judicial proceedings.
(2). Parliamentary proceedings.
(3). Certain public meetings [provided for by statute in
England].
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If, then, the publication is made on any of the occasions
enumerated above, whether the matter which calls it forth is
of public or private interest, it is primafacie privileged, and no
action will lie against the publisher. The word "privilege" in
this connection means nothing more than immunity from
action in the honest exercise of a right, that is to say, when
an occasion exists where a right may be exercised, or a duty
must be fulfilled, and defamatory statements are uttered, it is
presumed that they are published in consequence of such right
or duty. If such is the case they form no ground for an
action; but if the occasion is taken advantage of for the pur-
pose of satisfying personal ill-will and spite, and not for the
purpose above named, then the primafacie case of privilege is
destroyed.
Thus, in the technical language of the cases, the ordinary
presumption of malice arising from the fact that the words
used are defamatory, is rebutted by the existence of a privi-
leged occasion, and the burden of proof is cast upon the
plaintiff to show that the occasion was abused and that there
was express malice. The question is purely one of the defend-
ant's bonafides.
In the phrase " malice in fact," or "express malice," the
word malice, as has been intimated above, is used in its ordi-
nary sense and implies a wrong motive on the part of the pub-
lisher of the defamatory words.
As Judge BRETT said in Clark v. AMolyneaux (3 Q. B.
D. 247), " We are here dealing with malice in fact, and malice
then means a wrong feeling in a man's mind ;" and the defini-
tion given by Judge BAYLEY in Bromage v. Prosser (4 B. & C.
255), "A wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or
excuse," applies to implied malice rather than to malice in
fact.
As the onus of proving actual malice lies on the plaintiff,
it is not sufficient for him to prove facts which are consistent
with either bona fides or ma/a fides, he must go further, and
prove facts which are more consistent with the latter than the
former view before he can have the question of malice sub-
mitted to the jury. Actual malice need not, however, be
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always proved by extrinsic evidence; it is often inferable from
the terms of the libel itself and the method of publication.
When the plaintiff attempts to prove malice extrinsically,
the sole question at issue being the motive of the defendant,
the courts have always been very liberal in the admission of
evidence to prove that motive. Anything which goes to show
the hostility, enmity or bad feeling of the defendant against
the plaintiff, before, at or since the speaking of the defamatory
words, is admissable as evidence of actual malice, for the
existence of bad feeling, before or after the publication, raises a
presumption that it existed at the time of the publication.
Thus, proof of the publication of another libel is evidence
of malice in the publication of the one in question, as is also
repetition or reassertion of the defamatory charges. And it
has been held, both in England and in this country, that a
plea of truth, to an action for defamatory words spoken on an
occasion which is primafacie privileged, which is unsupported
by any evidence, is of itself evidence of malice. The mere fact,
however, that the words are untrue is no evidence of malice,
for if the words were true the defendant would have no need
of his privilege, but could plead truth. If, however, the plain-
tiff proves that the defendant knew the statements to be false
when he uttered them, he can, of course, recover, as such
knowledge would be inconsistent with bona fides.
Intrinsic evidence of malice may be gathered both from
the matter and the manner of the publication, but it is impos-
sible to lay down any rule to guide us in cases where the
expressions employed are exaggerated.
Each case must depend upon its own facts, and the most
that we can say is that the mere fact that the words used are
strong ones is no evidence of malice, provided they are such
as the defendant might have honestly employed under
the circumstances ; but if the language is utterly uncalled for,
or improper motives are unnecessarily imputed, the fact that
the language is uncalled for, and the imputation unnecessary,
is evidence of actual malice.
As was said above, the statements need not be reasonable
in the eyes of the jury, but if they are wholly unreasonable
AND FAIR COMMENT.
the jury is entitled to infer actual malice from the fact of their
unreasonableness.
With regard to the manner of the publication it must be
remembered that privileged publications should not be made
to any others than those who can be benefited by such pub-
lication. " Confidential communications should not be shouted
across the street for all the world to hear."
If, then, the publication is made to others than those who
can be benefited by a knowledge of the facts stated, this fact
is evidence of actual malice.
It is for the Court to say, as matter of law, whether the
publication is primafacie privileged, and if it is found to be so,
then the jury are to decide whether the right, which is the
subject of the privilege, was honestly exercised or abused.
CRITICISNf AND COMMENT.
Having thus briefly defined the grounds of privileged
publications, the subject of criticism and fair comment may be
taken up.
It is not intended, however, and would be impossible
within the limits of this brief essay, to give any historical
account of the growth and final establishment of the freedom
of speech in England and this country. All that will be
attempted is a discussion of the nature and extent of this
right of criticism, and an examination of the principles applied,
in cases where it is set up as a defence to an action for libel,
to see wherein they differ from those applied in the cases of
qualified privilege discussed above.
THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT.
The right of free comment, that is, the right to express
an opinion on acts or things done or proposed, and to point
out their merits and defects, is a distinguishing mark of free-
dom and its benefits cannot be too highly rated, as it is only
by its exercise that the wisdom of the people is brought for-
ward to mould and form the government and public institu-
tions, in accordance with the sentiment of the nation. As
one writer aptly puts it, " No great political improvement, no
great reform, either legislative or executive, has ever been
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originated in any country ky its rulers. The first suggesters
of such steps have invariably been bold and able thinkers,
who have discerned the abuse,. denounced it, and pointed out
how it is to be remedied." (Buckle's History of Civilization,
Vol I, p. 28.)
It is, therefore, of the utmost necessity that this right
should be exercised without fear or favor; and so it is that no
matter how severe the criticism, if the jury, in any action in
which the right is set up as a defence, find that it was honestly
exercised, the plaintiff cannot recover.
The criticism must be of an act or tling, not of a person.
True criticism never attacks the person directly, and though
in the criticism of acts imputations are often necessarily cast
on the actor, yet such a personal charge can only be made in
connection with and in consequence of an act criticized.
Again, while there may be criticism of a person as well as of
a thing, in the.broad sense of the word [for to say that a man
is a thief, or a murderer, is nothing more than the opinion of
the person making the charge] yet the law will not permit
a man to excuse such charges on the ground that they are
criticism. (Zlarwoocd v. Astley, I Bos. & Pul. N. R. 47.)
A man is to be judged by his acts, and if the acts are
matters of public interest they may be'freely criticised.
But the facts or things commented on must be proved to
exist, or to have existed. It is no excuse that the writer
honestly believed that the facts on which he based his criti-
cism existed. (Bryce v. Rusden, 2 Times L. R. 435 ; Brenan
v. Ridgway, 3 Times L. R. 592; Stewart v. McKinley, I I
Vict.. Law Rep. [Australia] 802.]. In Davis & Sons v.
Siepstone (L. R. I I Ap. Cas. 187), the defendants had in their
newspaper falsely charged the plaintiff, a public officer, with
certain acts, and then severely criticised the acts. The acts
charged were absolutely untrue and unsupported by evidence.
The verdict having been found for the plaintiff, an appeal was
taken, and Lord HERSCHEL, in delivering the opinion of the
Court, affirming the judgment of the Court below, said:
"There is no doubt that the public acts of a public man may law-
fully be made the subject of fair comment or criticism, but the
distinction cannot be too clearly borne in mind betwee-n com-
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ment or criticism and allegation of fact. In the present case,
the appellants charged the respondent with having been guilty
of specific acts of misconduct, and then proceeded, on the
assumption that the charges were true, to comment upon his
proceedings in language in the highest degree offensive and
injurious. In their Lordship's opinion there is no warrant
for the doctrine that defamatory matter, thus published, is
regarded by the law as the subject of any privilege."
In Lefroy v. Burnside No. 2, 4 L. R. Ir. 556, the same
principle was laid down, Baron PALLES saying: "That a fair
and bona fide comment on a matter of public int erest is an ex-
cuse of what would otherwise be a defamatory publication is
admitted. The very statement, however, of this rule assumes
the matters of fact commented on to be somehow or other
ascertained. It does not mean that a man may invent facts,
and comment on the facts so invented in what would be a fair
and bona fide manner, on the supposition that the facts were
true.
"Not only must the facts on which the criticism is based
be proved to exist, but defamatory criticism, to be excused,
must be fair and bona fide. These are the two prerequisites
usually laid down in the cases. The term "bona fide" is simple
enough and easy to understand, and while the question of
bona fides may be difficult to decide in a particular case, it is
to be submitted to the jury in the same way as in the cases of
privilege noted above.
" If the statements are defamatory, for what purpose did
the defendant make them ? If in the honest exercise of the
right of criticism, in order to point out and correct some sup-
posed defect in the act criticised, then they are excused ; but if
the occasion was misused-if the defendant was maliciously
striking at the individual, under cover of his act, then his ex-
cuse avails him nothing and his words are actionable."
The unnecessary and unfortunate use of the word " fair,"
in this connection, has led to a confusion of ideas similar to
the one noticed above in Clark v. Molyneux and Briggs v.
Garrett, with reference to the word reasonable, and the same
objection can be urged against the use of the word fair here as
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were urged against the use of the word reasonable in those
cases.
If "fair" is used in the sense we contend (as meaning
fair in the eyes of the person making the comment), it is
superfluous, as its meaning is necessarily included in the term
bona fide.
The only other possible contention is that the word is
used as meaning fair in the eyes of the jury. But to ascribe
such a meaning to it would be to practically destroy the right
of criticism, nor do the authorities bear out such a reading.
Criticism, as has been said, is but opinion, and if the
fairness of the criticism were to be left to the jury it would
destroy our boasted right of free expression of public opinion,
and make a body of untrained-often grossly ignorant-men,
the censors of public taste and judgment.
What an absurdity it would be to give a man -a right to
freely express his opinion, and in the same breath to destroy
this right by excusing its exercise only when the opinion
expressed agreed with the opinion formed by the jury. The
result would be to drive public writers to pander to the people,
and leave the censorship of public morals and all the institu-
tions of government in the hands of the rabble.
That the word fair is not used in this latter sense is
shown in Strauss v. Francis' (No. 2), 4 F. & F. 1 17, where
Chief Justice COCKBtJRN, in charging the jury, laid down the
rule as follows:
"9 You must say whether in this case you think
the critique was the fair and genuine result of the judgment of
the critic upon the work, or whether it was prompted by reck-
less disregard of the author's feelings. The critic who sits in
judgment upon the works of others is no doubt bound to be
impartial, but he cannot be infallible, and even although you
should be of opinion that the work did not wholly deserve
the description given of it, still that is not the question. The
question is whether, as a whole, the criticism was fair or promp-
ted by motives of another character." And although the
word fair is here used, it can only be in the sense of bona fide
as the context plainly shows.
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So in Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & V. 320, Baron PARKE
lays down the principle that remarks made in a fair spirit on a
matter of public interest are justifiable under the general issue,
the very use of the word spirit showing that the fairness vias
a question for the speaker, not the jury.
Again, in Turnbull v. Bird, 2 F. & F. 5o (which was a
case of criticism of a public man), Chief Justice EiuRz, in
addressing the jury, said: "The rule in these cases is that the
comments are justified, provided the defendant honestly
believed that they were fair and just."
So in the famous case of Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 F. &
F. 372, Chief Justice COCKBURN said: " It is admitted that the
public conduct of a public man is a fair subject for hostile
criticism, provided that the language of the writer is kept
within the limits of an honest intention to discharge a public
duty."
To multiply authorities on this point is unnecessary, as
even Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769, and Merivale
v. Carson, 20 Q. B. D. 275, which deny that there is a privilege
in the exercise of this right of comment; admit that the ques-
tion of fairness is not for the jury but for the publisher of the
a~ticle.
The only important case which appears to conflict with
this view is Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4, Q. B. 73, where, in re-
fusing a new trial on the ground of misdirection, Chief Justice
COCKBURN said: "A critic must bring to his task a reason-
able degree of judgment and moderation, so that the result
may be what a jury shall deem a fair and legitimate criticism
on the conduct and motives of the party who is the object of
censure." But this must be regarded as a slip, especially as
he himself charged the jury in the case and told them that
the question for them was whether this privilege had been
honestly and fairly exercised.
It will next be material to consider how far this right can
extend -and whether a critic is limited simply to a discussion /
of an act or thing, or whether he may go further, and fron
the existence and nature of the act deduce the motive of the
actor. But the determination of this question is necessarily
included in the previous question as to the extent of protection
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given to the exercise of the right of criticism. If the occasion
of the exercise of this right is a privileged one, then there
certainly should be a privilege in the honest, though erroneous
imputation of motives. If not, if criticism is not privileged in
the §ense that the word has been used, then of course any
imputation of bad motive is inexcusable, for it then falls
within the ordinary rules of libellous matter, having no
privilege to protect it. It will therefore be convenient to
postpone the discussion of this point until we take up the
question of privilege as applied to bona fide criticism, -and
and before the discussion of the question of privilege it will be
material to enquire into the extent of the right.
THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT.
This right of criticism and comment is generally agreed
to extend to all matters of public interest, but it is somewhat
difficult to explain exactly what constitutes a matter of public
interest. We can only say that it is any matter which in any
way concerns the welfare of the public and the well-being of
society.
None of the writers on the subject have attempted (per-
haps wisely) to define its limits, they have only enumerated
the classes of matters which have arisen so far, and which
have been adjudged to fall within those limits.
Odgers classifies them as follows:
(I). Affairs of State.
(2). The administration of justice.
(3)- Public institutions and local authorities.
(4). Ecclesiastical matters.
(5). Books, pictures and architecture.
(6). Theatres, concerts and other public entertainments.
(7). Other appeals to the public. (Odgers on Libel and
Slander, p. 41).
Under the head of affairs of State are included all
matters which concern the government and administration of
public offices, thus the following have been held proper
subjects of criticism:
A petition to Parliament impugning the character of a
public officer, (Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4, Q. B. 73), petition
AND FAIR COMMENT*
presented to Parliament praying for alterations in a certain
law, (Dunne v. Anderson, Ryan & Moody 287), evidence gien
before Parliament on a local bill, (Hedley v. Barlow, 4 F. & F.
224), evidence given before a Royal Commission, (Mulkerx V.
Ward, L. R. 13, Eq. 622), Government appointments, (Tq*.
budl v. Biid, 2 F. & F. 508, Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 F. &
F. 372), Report of Board-of Admiralty, (-enwood v. Harrison,
L. R. 7, C. P. 6o6), public career of members of Parliament or
candidate, (Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 C. & P. 222), and private
character as going to show public fitness, (Wilson v. Reed, t
al, 2 F. & F. 149, Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 F. & F. 372,
Harwood v. Astley, i Bos. & Pul. N. R. 47, Wisdom v. Brown,
i Times L. R. 412, Pankhurst v. Hamilton, 3 Times L. R. 500).
Under the Second Head, i. e., the administration of
justice, are included such cases as discussion'of evidence
given, (Hedley v. Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224), conduct of parties,
(Risk Allah Bey v. Wtitehurst, et al, I8 L. T. Rep. 615),
(Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East 693), attorneys, ( Woodgate v. Ridout 4
F. & F. 202), judges, (Hibbens v. Lee, 4 F. & F. 243).
The cases falling under the head of public institutions
and local authorities are such as administration of the poor
law (Purcellv. Sowler, 2 C. P_ D. 218) conduct of parish way
warden (Harlev. Catherall, 14 L. T. R. 8oi), the management
of a medical college (Coz v. Feeny, 4 F. & F., 13), management
of prison (Massie v. Toronto Printing Co., i i Ontario, 362),
the conduct of the mayor (Wallis v. Bazet, 34 Louisiana An-
nual 13 1), trustee -of private corporation. Crane v. Waters,
io Federal Reporter p. 619; Wilson v.- Fitch, 41 Cal. 363
(contra).
Under the fourth head are included:
The method of conducting service in the Church of
England (Kelly v. Tiling L. R., i Q. B. 699), and the con-
duct of rector in management of his parish. Kelly v. Sherlock,
L. R. i Q. B. 686.
Under the fifth head:
Any book published for general circulation (Strauss v.
Francis (No. 1) 4 F. & F. 939; Tabart v. Tipper, I Campbell
350; Carr v. Hood, i Campbell 355- (n); Reed v. Sweetzer,
6 Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 9; Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wendell
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434), or painting (Whistler v. Ruskin, London Times Nov.
26th & 27th, 1878, see " The Gentle Art of Making Enemies,"
London, 189o; Thompson v. Shackell, Moody & Malkin, 187),
or building (Soane v. Knight, Moody & Malkin 74), or news-
paper articles. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 Best & Smith 769.
Under the sixth head :
A public ball (Reg v. Flowers, 44 Justice of the Peace
377) or concert (Dibdin v. Swan, I Espinasse 28), or flower
show (Greene v. Chapman, 4 Bing. N. C. 92), or play (Merivale
v. Carson, 20 Q. B. D. 277), or opera (Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y.
324), or other subject of exhibition. Marrison v. Belcher, 3
F. & F. 614; Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass., 234.
Under the seventh head:
Any other appeals to the public as patent medicine adver-
tisements (Hunter v. Share, 4 F. & F. 983), other advertise-
me'nts (Paris v. Levy, 9 C. B. N. S. 342; Jenner v. A'Beckett,
L. R. 7 Q. B. I I), a man's grievances or wrongs to which he
himself has called public attention (Odger v. M31ordimer, 28
L. T.'472), conduct of persons at a public meeting (Davis v.
Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396), a school for short-hand which had
been advertised (Press Co. v. Stewart, I 19 Pa. 584), the ability
and methods of a drawing teacher in a public school, her dis-
missal having been a matter of public discussion (0' Conner v.
Sill, 6o Mich. 175), ability of an actor, Duplany v. Davis, 3
Times L. R. 184. Rex v. Forbes, I Crawford & Dix. C. C.
157; Clifford v. Brandon, 2 Campbell 358; Gregory v. Duke
of Brunswick and Vallance, I Carr & Kirwan, 23.
The first four classes are of public interest because they
concern the welfare of the State, the latter three are not mat-
ters of public interest, in a strict use of that term, but are fit
subjects for criticism because the party acting has offered his
act or work to the public, and has challenged them to criticise
it.-
Mr. Townsend points" out that it is not the publicity of
the act upon which the right of comment depends, but the
distinction should be between criticism of acts which it con-
cerns the public to know and those which it does not concern
the public to know. Townsend on Slander and Libel, Sec.
534
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260. "And," he adds, "upon principle private acts are
equally with public acts the subject of criticism."
The difference between the-extent 6f criticism allowable in
matters of public and those of private interest is not one of
kind but of degree. From the very nature of their position
public men must submit. to much hostile and adverse criti-
cism. As Chief Justice COCKBURN puts it: "All men who
occupy public positions must submit now and then to be
a little roughly handled and to be uncurteously and often un-
justly treated. It has happened to everybody who has had
anything to do with public life, to have, at one time or another,
observations made upon his conduct and motives, which in all
probability at the bottom of his heart he has felt to be un-
founded and unjust; but we submit to it, because we know that
bringing, by means of the public press, the conduct and motives
of public men to the bar of public opinion is the best security
for the discharge of public duty. Sejmour v. Buterworth,
3 Foster and Finlason,'p. 372.
Again, with regard to the discussion of literature, art,
etc., Lord ELLENBOROUGH lias said: "Liberty of criticism must
be allowed or we should have neither purity of taste or of
morals. Fair discussion is essentially necessary to the ttuth
of history and the advancement of science. That publication,
therefore, I shall never consider a libel which has for its object
not to injure the reputation of any individual, but to correct
misrepresentations of fact, to refute sophistical reasoning, to
expose a vicious taste in literature, or to censure what is hostile
to morality." Tabart v. Tipper, i Campbell 350.
Now, if the matter is one of private interest it does not
follow that, therefore, it cannot be criticised-all that the'
cases decide is that the same freedom of criticism cannot be
allowed as if the matter were of public interest.
Thus Baron ALDERSON says: "That criticism may reason-
ably be applied to a public man in a public capacity which
might not be applied to a private individual," (Parrmiter v.
Coupland, 6 M. & W. io9,) clearly intimating that criticism of
private individual, or rather of his acts, might be permissible
under certain circumstances; and in Gathercole v. Mial, 15 M.
& W. 320, this whole subject was clearly discussed and the
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rule laid down that while in the discussion of a matter of
public interest a bona fide comment which was defamatory
might be excused, even if untrue and unjust, yet if the matter
was a private one any criticism must be based on truth. The
comment on a public matter Chief Baron POLLOCK character-
izes as "licentious" as opposed to that which must be based
upon truth, and he adds, " In the present case the question is
whether a parochial charity-charity confined to certain per-
sons within a parish-may be made the subject of a licentious
comment. I own I think that every purpose of public good
would be answered by strictly confining it to the privilege
that every man has of publishing that which is true, and that
it is not at all necessary in a case of this sort (i. e. a private
matter) to give him any power, either licentiously or with
honest prejudice, to invent for himself or to misrepresent and
comment upon matters that do not exist in point of fact, how-
ever honestly,"
With all due deference to the high authority from which
it emanates, it is submitted that this decision, while correct in
point of law, was improperly arrived at. There is in reality
no difference between the right of criticism of a public or
- private act, strictly speaking one may be as freely criticized as
the other, except that the Courts are naturally inclined to
allow greater latitude in the former than in the latter, because
the interest concerned are greater. The only difference
between the two is as to the extent of the right of publication.
A criticism of a matter of public interest may be published
to the whole world-that of a matter of private interest only to
the parties interested (Hog-an v. Sutton et al., 16 Weekly
Reporter [Eng.] 127), and in case the publication is made to
parties other than those interested, that fact may be left to the
jury as evidence of malice. The rule is exactly the same as
in the case of qualified privilege noted above. Surely it could
not be contended that if "A," one of the members of a private
club, were to criticize the acts of the president of that club in
the presence of a fellow-member, that the president would
have a good ground of action against "A," and the latter
must prove the truth of his assertions to escape.
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If such were the law there would be no such thing as a
right of fair comment on matters of private jnterest (a propo-
sition that has never been advanced) and the only defence,
if the words were defamatory, would be truth, or a privilege
on some of the grounds enumerated above.
If, then, our propositions are sound, the Court should
have instructed the jury in Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W.,
320, that fair and bona fide comment on a matter of private
interest is allowable, though the comments are defamatory,
but that such comments should not be made except to those
interested in the matter, and the fact that they % ere here made
to the whole world was evidence that the occasion was not used
bona fide, for the purpose of fair comment, but was taken ad-
vantage of for the purpose of 'ratifying some malicious feeling
toward the plaintiff.
The clothing club in question in Gathercole v. A1ziall, 15 M.
& W. 320, was private, and its benefits were intended for a
limited number of persons, so it was in no sense a matter fit
for public iiscussion. In the same case the Court were
equally divided on the question whether a sermon preached, but
not printed or published to the world, was a subject of public
comment, and Baron POLLOCK raised the question whether a
book printed for private circulation could be publicly criti-
cized intimating as his opinion that it could not. In Kelly v.
Sherlock, L. R. I. Q. IB. 686, the plaintiff was the incumbent
of a church, and the defendant th6 proprietor of a newspaper,
and Baron BRAMWELL, in charging the jury, told them that the
disagreement between the plaintiff and his organist was a mat-
ter of public interest, and in Kelly v. Tnling, L. R. I. Q. B.
699, it was decided that a charge against the plaintiff (who
was the same person as in the case above), preferred by one
of his church wardens, to the effect that he allowed books to
be sold in the church during service, and turned the vestry
room into a cooking apartment, was a matter of public interest
and a criticism on it could be published in the defendant's
newspaper.
In Wilson v. Fitch, 41 California, 363, the conduct of the
trustee of a private corporation was held not to be a matter
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of public interest, although shares of the stock of the company
were on the market.
In Crane v. Waters et at., io Federal Reporter, p. 619,
the defendants had published in their newspaper an article
concerning an attempt made by the plaintiff to control the
election of directors of a railroad, with a view of effecting the
consolidation of certain short lines. The writer compared
the plaintiff's action to similar dealings of his before with re-
gard to another road, which, it alleged, he brought to bank-
ruptcy.
The article was headed "History Repeated." The
Judge ruled that this matter was of interest to the public, in
the sense of the unascertained persons through whose land
the proposed road would pass, and the persons who would be
asked to take shares of stock in the new concern. [In this
latter view the decision conflicts with If ilson v Fitch. supra.]
The Judge also remarked that the right of Legislative inter-
ference might be a test of whether the matter was one of public
interest or not, for while the Legislature could not interfere in
the private affairs of a corporation, it could certainly prevent
such a consolidation as the one suggested.
The private conduct of a man is not involved in his pub-
lic acts, and cannot be criticized publicly (Dunne v. Anderson
Ry & Moody 287, Fry v. Bennett, 287 N. Y. 324; ilson v.
Reed, 2 F. & F. 149; Stuart v. Lovell, 2 Starkie, 93.), but
the character of a man as an author may be ridiculed (Carr v.
Hood, I Camp. 355 [n.]), and also the private character
of a candidate for public office as showing fitness for that
office.
These few examples show how difficult it is to draw the
line between matters of public and private interest, for whether
a matter falls within one class or the other depends almost
entirely upon the circumstances of each particular case.
The question whether the matter is fit subject for public
comment is like the question of privilege or no privilege, pri-
marily for the Court.
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IS THERE A PRIVILEGE IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF
CRITICISM?
/
As has been said before, the question whether a critic
from a view of the act itself, is justified in ascribing motives to
the actor, is intimately connected with the question whether
there is a qualified privilege in the exercise of the right of
criticism, either one being established, is conclusive of the
existence of the other.
Thus, if there is no privilege it follows that imputation of
motives should not be allowed, for -in imputing motives the
critic leaves the act and dire6tly attacks the actor, and the
charge being defamatory falls within the ordinary rules appli-
cable to libellous matter and is actionable.
On the other hand, if a motive may be imputed, there
must be a privilege to protect this defamatory charge against
the person of the actor.
It may be said that you cannot libel an act or thing, and
as criticism is confined to a discussion of acts or things that
tha exercise of the right does not necessarily require a privilege
to protect it, although a severe criticism of an act is an indirect.
charge against the author of the act. Granting for the sake
of argument that this is true, it is also true that an imputation
of motive is a charge against the person of the actor directly,
and if honest though erroneous imputations of motive are
excused, it must be because of some privilege attaching to the
exercise of the right.
It is to be noticed that the cases on this subject use the
expressions " fair comment," and "fair discussion," as well as
the word "criticism." In fact the right is usually character-
ized as the right of fair comment,
Now while the word criticism applies essentially to a
judgment or opinion on an act or thing based on an examina-
tion of the act or thing itself, comment and discussion are both
more comprehensive in their meaning, and include not only
criticism, but explanation of, and reasons deduced from that
criticism.
So much for the inferences that may be drawn from the
terms in which the right is defined.
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As to the expediency of allowing such imputation of mo-
tive to be made there can be little doubt. It has been urged
against this view that to give a critic power to impute motives
is to place a very dangerous weapon in his hands, that our
public men have to suffer much from hostile critics as it is,
and.that to allow the latter this right in addition, would be to
expose a public servant to every kind of vicious and spiteful
attack, without means of redress.
But the answer to such an argument is that such imputa-
tion of motive is not excused unless made bonafide, and its
reasonableness is a test of its bona ides. If a motive is ascribed
to the actor which is false, and if the act criticized gives no
ground for such an imputation, a jury will be slow to allow it
to be excused as criticism.
Motive may play a small part in many public acts, but
on the other hand, in many cases, the cause or object of an
act determines its character as commendable or otherwise.
Thus, for example, the appointment of a man to a public
office for which he is not altogether unqualified may be a per-
fectly indifferent act, but if the motive for the appointment is
a corrupt one the act becomes censurable. If then it were the
rule that an imputation of bad motive could only be excused
on the ground of truth, it would follow that some of the most
glaring public corruption would remain unexposed, for unless
the motive for the acts done in its furtherance, was perfectly
patent, a critic would hesitate to subject himself to an action
by imputing one which, however reasonable it might seem to
him, might yet possibly turn out not to be the true one. Of
course the motive, to be censurable, must be material;
it must be as much a matter of public interest and concern,
as the act itself, and the bad motive imputed must be a
reasonable deduction from the act itself; that is, while it
need not be reasonable in the eyes of the jury, it must not
be so unreasonable as to be evidence to them of malice.
I In Carr v. Hood, I Campbell, 355 (n), Lord ELLEN-
BOROUGH charged the jury that ridicule of the plaintiff as an
author was not actionable, but he adds: "Show me an attack
on the moral character of the plaintiff or any attack on
his character, unconnected with his authorship, and I shali
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be as ready as any judge who ever sat here to protect him,
but I cannot hear of malice on account of turning his works
into ridicule."
The same principle is also laid down in Madeod v. Wak-
ley, 3 C. & P. 311, and Soane v. Knight, Mood & Mal. 74.
So in cases where a bad motive is imputed to the author
of any act, a similhr rule is applied and the general principle
deducible from the cases may be laid down as follows:
(I.) It is for the Court to say whether the particular
charge is so far connected with and so far arises out of the
subject of discussion that a public writer might honestly (bona
fide) in discussing these'subjects make such imputations.
(2.) It is for the jury to say whether (the Court having
found that the deduction might be honestly made) the defend-
ant was honestly exercising his right. Thus the first proposi-
tion is established by such cases as Harwood v. Astley, I Bos.
& Pul. N. R. 47, in which the Court ruled as matter of law
that to charge the plaintiffwho was a candidate for Parliament,
with being a scoundrel, a coward, liar, murderer, etc., was not
excusable as criticism.
So in Wdson v. Reed, 2 F. & F. 149, the Court charged
the jury that while the fact that corrupt practices had prevailed
at a recent election, was one of public interest and could be
criticised, the assertion that in pursuance of the purpose of
defeating these corruptions writs had been issued against the
plaintiff was not criticism, and if defamatory was actionable.
So in Hibbins v. Lee, 4 F. & F. 243, Chief Justice CocK-
BURN told the jury that if the alleged libel meant simply to
criticize the conduct of the magistrates, in dismissing a charge
of felony, it was a proper subject for comment as the
administration of justice is a matter of public interest; but if
it meant that the accused was guilty and would have been
so if the case had not been dismissed, then it amounts to a
charge of felony and is not protected by any privilege." Reg.
v. Tanfield, 42 J. P. 423.
In Smith v. Tribune Co.4 Bissell (U.S. C. C.) 477,the alleged
libel charged that the plaintiff was an accomplice of John Brown
in his Virginia raid, and in order to escape detection afterwards
he feigned insanity and took refuge in a lunatic asylum.
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A plea of privilege on the ground that the plaintiff was
a public man and these charges were made as criticism with
bona fides and reasonable ground for belief was adjudged bad
on demurrer, because there is no privilege in distinctly charg-
ing a man with a crime.
So in Lefroy v. Burnside No; 2, L. R. 4. Ir. 556, the
subject was carefully discussed Baron PALLES, saying: "It was
contended during the argument that the statement of one fact
cannot be excused as fair comment upon another fact. That
proposition is, in my opinion, too wide, and I cannot concur in
it, but I think that when a matter of fact is to be excused as
comment upon another fact, the fact alleged and sought to be
excused must be a reasonable inference from the facts alleged
and upon which it is a comment. Whether the fact averred
be capable of being reasonably inferred from such other facts
is a matter of law if on the other hand it be capable
of being inferred whether in the particular case it ought to be
inferred is for the jury." See also Massie v. Toronto Printing-
Co., I1 Ontario 362, and Neeb v. Hope, x I Pa. 145.
On the other hand the Court having found that the
particular charge is so far connected with the subject of
discussion that a critic might honestly have made these
imputations, then the question is for the jury as to whether
the right w s properly exercised and the imputations honestly
made. Thus in Turnbull v. Bird, 2 F. & F. 5o8, the plaintiff,
a Roman Catholic of avowed Jesuitical tendencies, as his
writings showed, was appointed Calendarer of foreign state
papers, the defendant in criticizing the propriety of the
appointment, argued. that such a person as the plaintiff might
be tempted to alter, mutilate and destroy the papers, owing to
his religious prejudices. Chief Justice ERLE said to the jury,
I am of opinion that the occasion would justify the comments
provided they can be brought within the limits laid down by
the law in this class of cases, and the rule is that the comments
are justified, provided the defendant honestly believed that
they were fair and just."
In Paris v. Levy, 9 C. B. N. S. 341, a case immediately
preceding Turnbull v. Bird, the judge improperly left to the
jury the question whether in their opinion the imputation on
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the tendency of the hand-bill criticized was fair and well
founded; but in Morrison v. Belcher, 3 F. & F. 614, Chief
Justice COCKBURN follows Turnbull and Bird and recedes from
his apparent position in Campbellv. Spotiswoode, although he
distinctly affirms that case, for he says: "The law laid dowii
in this Court at the last sitting, in the case of Campbellv.
Spottiswoode, was lately confirmed by the Court of Queen's
Bench and it was this: "It is not because a public writer might
not be able to prove to the letter all he had stated, that there-
fore he was liable; but the jury must be of opinion that his
observations and inferences were fair and legitirhate under the
circumstances, or that they were not so unfair as to be reckless
and thus in law malicious." So again in the case of the Earl of
Cardigan, 3 F. & F. 620 (note), the charge proceeds upon the
same ground. In the famous case of Campbell v. Spottiswoode,
3 F. & F. 421, the sole question decided by the Court in banc
was that honest belief in the imputations would not justify the
defendant, and while at first sight this appears to conflict with
the previous cases in reality it does not, but according to the
charge of the judge was a perfectly proper decision.
The facts of the case were briefly as follows.
The plaintiff, editor of a religious paper, published
appeals for assistance in circulating his paper with a view to
promote certain missions in China, and also letters and lists of
subscription which he had already received, in answer to his
appeals. The defendant was the printer of the Saturday
Review, and the alleged libellous matter was contained in an
article in that paper, the effect of which was found by the
jury to be to charge that the plaintiff's real object was to puff
his paper and to suggest that the letters and subscription lists
were probably fabricated.
In charging the jury Chief Justice COCKBURN said: "It
was perfectly lawful for a public writer to say that it was an
idle scheme, and that it was a delusion to suppose, that by
forcing these papers into circulation by free distribution the
great cause of missions would be promoted, and if you think
- that this is all which has really been done in this case, then it
is within the fair and legitimate scope of criticism, and you
ought to find a verdict for the defendant, but the question is
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whether the writer has not gone the length of imputing to
Dr. Campbell, not merely that he has proposed a delusive and
mischievous scheme, but that he has done so with the sordid
motive of abusing the confidence of the public and increasing
the subscriptions to his newspaper. If you think that, then
the case assumes a different character, that is to say, if you
think that you are not to find for the plaintiff because the
charge cannot be excused as a fair comment."
If the charge, could not be excused as fair comment,
honest belief in its truth was of course unavailing as a defence,
and the refusal of the Court in banc to grant a new trial on
the ground that honest belief alone was sufficient to excuse
the defendant, was perfectly proper because the judge had
ruled as matter of law that if the meaning of the words was
as found by the jury they could not be excused as fair com-
ment, and no exception was taken to this charge. Now,
curiously enough, the judge, in a latter part of the charge, in
discussing the amount of damages to be awarded, gives as
his opinion that the plaintiff's means to carry out his ends
were of a somewhat doubtful character, and that the view
taken by the defendant might easily and naturally suggest
itself to the mind. In other words, his opinion was that the
charge was one which was reasonable.. He also asked the
jury to take into consideration the fact of honest belief and if
they believed that the writer honestly believed what he said
to find this as a special fact. '
It must be remembered that this action was against
the printer, and so no evidence of the writer's actual belief
could have been given, as it would have been wholly irrele-
vant. It follows, therefore, that in finding that the writer
believed his imputations to be well founded, the jury really
found that the plaintiff's publications were such as would
naturally lead to such a belief
This. certainly amounted, in effect, to a verdict for the
defendant, and it is submitted that the Court would have
granted a new trial on the ground of mis-direction had the
point been properly taken, unless the rule be that no imputa-.
tion, however fair and reasonable, can be excused unless true,
and in the light of both the earlier and later cases this view is
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wholly untenable. It was indeed stated that Mr. Sovill, for
the plaintiff, in argument of the motion for a new trial, insisted
that the question should have been left to the jury whether
the imputations contained in the libel were in excess of fair
comment or not, instead of being decided by the Court as
matter of law, but the point does not appear to have been
grasped by any of the Court, while CROMPTON and BLACK-
BURN, two of the Judges, appear to have had the idea that the
question has been so left and their opinions are based upon
the supposition that this was the case and that the jury had
found the imputations to be beyond the range of fair comment.
It has been thought by many writers that this decision
greatly narrowed the limit of the right of cuiticism, and in
support of this view they cite the familiar words of Chief
Justice COCKBURN.
"A line must be drawn between criticism upon public
conduct and the imputation of motives by which that conduct
may be supposed to be actuated. One man has no right to
impute to another, whose conduct may be fairly open to ridi-
cule or disapprobation, base, sordid and wicked motives un-
less there is so much ground for the imputation that a jury
shall find not only that he had an honest belief in the truth of
his statements, but that his belief was not without foundation."
It will be seen by a moment's thought that the words
"not without foundation," are the cause of the contention, for
they seem at first to imply that the imputations can only be
excused when true. This reading, however, is opposed to all
previous and subsequent charges of the same great judge, and
if such a meaning had been intended it could have been put
in a few words and not in this roundabout way. They must
be taken to mean "reasonable" or "natural," and if this is
admitted, then the charge was in the line of the rule as laid
down and did not narrow the limits of the right, and as has
been shown above, the verdict should have been found for the
defendant, because the jury found in effect that the defendant's
belief was not only honest, but reasonable.
In Hibbs v. Wilkinson, I F. & F. 6o8, the plaintiff had
published as the opinion of the defendant of a third party
certain expressions which the defendant had never used. The
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defendant, in an article referring to this misquotation, re!-
marked that the plaintiff made the quotation with a malice
which evidently overcame his sense of truth and honesty, and
Chief Justice ERLE in charging the jury said, "Now, are the
expressions used by the defendant in commenting upon that
so intemperate as to satisfy you that he was actuated by an
improper motive, or are they such expressions as under the
circumstances were not too strong? Was there not ground
for the defendant saying, How is it possible that this can be a
mere mistake? Was not that a natural though rash conclu-
sion ? Was it not a natural desire to correct a misrepresenta-
tion of fact or was it the malicious and improper motive of
injuring the plaintiff? In the latter view find for the plaintiff
in the other view for the defendant."
In Hunter v. Sharp, 4 F. & F. 983, which was heard by
Chief Justice COCKBURN three years after the decision in
Campbell v. Spottiswoode, he maintained the principle already
laid down. In this case the charges against the plaintiff, based
upon highly colored and improbable medical advertisements
that he h ad published, were that he was a quack, impostor, etc.,
and while the judge spoke about the "reasonable and honest
exercise of the .ocation of public writer," he told the jury
that the imputation was one which might reasonably be made,
and added, "that the question for them was whether the de-
fendant was in the reasonable and honest exercise of his voca-
tion as a public writer, even although he was not fully war-
ranted in drawing the inferences he did." See also Risk Allah
Bey v. Whitehurst, et al., i8 L. T. R. 615 ; Odger v. Mortimer
28 L. T. R. 472.
Thus the fair statement of the rule is the one made above.
The Court having found that the imputation is on which
might be made the question for the jury is solely of the
bona fides of the defendant. Did he exercise his right in
the bona fide belief that his charge was true, or was the charge
made with such an absence of reasonable ground as to be
reckless, and therefore in the eyes of the law malicious ?
Lastly, the question presents itself, Is there a privilege
in the exercise of this right of criticism, and if so what is its
nature and extent ?
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By a privilege is meant "an immunity or protection from
liability in the honest exercise of a right in the free exercise
of which the public have an interest. The Law of Libel as
applied to Public Discussion, 15 Law. Mag. & Law Rev. 208.
That there is a privilege of some. kind is ufndoubted, as
we have shown from the fact that honest, though erroneous,
imputations of motive, based upon an examination of the act
itself, are excused.
Then, too, the fact that the fairness of any criticisfn is a
question" for the critic himself;, and not for 'the jury, shows
inferentially that there is a privilege in the e;xercise of the
right, for as there must be some limit to the right, and as that
limit is ultimately with the jury, if not on the question of
fairness it must be on the question of malice, but we have
seen that in cases of defamation where no privilege°exists the
question of malice is wholly immaterial.
Again, it follows that if there were no privilege, the
question of fairness would necessarily be with the jury, a re-
sult which, as has been shown, would practically destroy the
right of criticism, and render it a mere name.
It is unnecessary, however, to deduce further from the
theory of the right reasons for the existence of this privilege,
for a moment's examination of the cases on the subject will
show that it is generally recognized.
Thus in one of the earliest cases, the defendant had
charged the ,plaintiff with publishing books of an immoral
tendency, and under a plea of not guilty the'defendant offered to
prove that the plaintiff had published certain books with a
view to show that the supposed libel was a fair stricture upon
the common run of his publications. The-plaintiff objected to
the evidence, but Lord ELLENBOROUGH in admitting it said:
"'The main question here is quo' animo the defendant published
the article complained of, whether he meant to put down a
nuisance to public morals, or to prejudice the plaintiff?
"To ascertain this it is material to know the general nature
of the plaintiff's publications to which the libel alludes, and I
therefore think that the evidence is receivable. The plaintiff-
is bound to show that the defendant was actuated by malice;
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and the defendant discharges himself by proving the contrary."
(Tabart v. 7Tpper, I Camp., 350.)
In other words precisely the same principles are to be
applied in determining cases of this kind as are to be applied
n the cases of qualified privilege discussed above, and malice
must be proved in order to destroy the defendant's privilege.
So in Soane v. Knight, supra. p. 95, Lord TENTERDEN, in
charging the jury, said: "On such work, (i. e. architectural
productions) any man has a right to express his opinion, and
however mistaken in point of taste that opinion may be, or
however unfavorable to the merits of the author or artist, the
person entertaining it is not precluded from its fair, reasonable
and temperate expression,
In Gathercole v. Miall, 15 K. & W., 3 3 4 , Baron ALDERSON
in comparing criticism of public with that of private acts, re-
fers to the former as " licentious," and adds that in cases of
criticism of private acts, every purpose of public good would
be answered by strictly copfining it to the privilege that every
man has of publishing that which is true, and that it is not
at all necessary in cases of this sort to give him any power,
either licentiously or with honest prejudices, to invent for him-
self or to misrepresent and comment upon matters that do not
exist in point of fact, however honestly. This case carries the
rule to an extreme, for it clearly intimates that in cases of
criticism of public acts, a man is not only excused in the crit-
icism of proven acts, but may criticize those which he honestly
believes to exist, although, as a matter of fact, they do not.
This extension of the privilege is .denied in Lefroy v.
Burnside, No. 2,4 L. R. Ir. 553- Davis & Sons v. Shepstone,
I I Ap. Cas. I9o. Bryce v. Rusden, 2 Times L. R. 435, and
the later cases.
That a privilege does exist in making comments upon
public acts and imputations therefrom, is recognized in such
cases as Dibdin v. Swan, I Espinasse 28. Turnbull v. Bird,
2 F. & F. 5o8. Paris v. Levy, 2 F. & F. 71. orrison v.
Betcher, 3 F. & F. 614. Seymour v. Butterwortk, 3 F. & F.
384. CoX v. Feeny, 4 F. & F. 13. Woodgate v. Ridout, 4 F.
& F. 202. Hibbins v. Lee, 4 F. & F. 243. Hunter v, Sharpe,
4F. &F. 983. Straus v. Francis, No.2,4F. &F. I io7. Henwood
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v..Harrison, L. R. 7, C. P. 6o6. Gott v. PulsFer, 122 Mass.
235. Press Co. v. Stewart, 119 Pa. 584.
The principles governing the cases of qualified privilege
and the questiois to be decided by the judge-and jury respec-
tively have been already considered, and it will be unnecessary
to repeat them here, as the same lines have been followed in
these cases.
There appears however to be a slight confusion which
needs to be cleared up.
It has been supposed that the rules and principles govern-
ing the privilege which exists in the exercise of the right of
fair comment, differed from those governing the privilege
which exists in'the exercise of the rights and, duties which
we have enumerated above because of the apparent difference
between Clark & Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D., 237, supra pp. 24 & 25,
and Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769.
In the first case the judge charged the jury that in order
that the defendant might be privileged he must have had good
ground for believing what he said, and on appeal this charge
was held erroneous, and the rule laid down that the defendant
would be protected if he made the statements in the honest
belief that they were true, even if he had no reasonable ground
for his belief. In Campbell v. Spoltiswoode, on the other hand,
it was ruled by the Court in banc, that mere honest belief in
the truth of the charges would not entitle the defendant to his
privilege.
In the latter case, as we have shown, the decision was
proper, because the Court ruled as matter of law, that if libel
bore the meaning found by the jury it could not be excused
as fair comment. The fundamental difference, however, is
this: In cases like Clark v. Molyneux, the facts on which the
charge is based are uncertain; they may be facts which actually
exist or which exist only in the imagination of the defendant,
owing to erroneous report or other similar reason. Thus he
may make a charge which is neither reasonable in the eyes of
the jury nor of the average man, as an inference from the acts
as proved, but which was a reasonable inference in his eyes
from the facts as he saw them.
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On the other hand the very word "criticism" presupposes
an act to be criticised, and as has been shown the fundamental
definition of the word is an opinion on an act or thing based
on an inspection of that act or thing. If the act criticised
does hot exist the whole theory of criticism falls.
In the first case the defendant gives his opinion on an
uncertain state of facts as he' sees them, whether or not his
view of the facts is the correct one.
In the latter case he is drawing a logical inference from a
given premise.
Thus it is easy to see that a man may bona fide believe a
charge which is in no wak based on the facts as proved, and
which, therefore, cannot be excused as criticism.
But this difference is one which is necessary, because of
the essential character of these two rights, and an examination
of the cases will show that herein lies the only difference.
That is, if in the latter case, the Court finds as matter of
law that the inference is one which might be made, then the
question is to be left to the jury in the same way as in the
ordinary cases of qualified privilege. Is the comment fair
and bona fide? or more properly, as Chief Justice COCKBURN
puts itin Morrison v. Belcher, 3 F. & F. 621, "is it so unfair
as to be reckless and thus in law malicious?" or in other
words, is it bona fide? for if it is utterly reckless then it is not
legally bonafide. Unreasonableness is n6t conclusive against
the defendant's privilege-it is only an evidentiary fact going
to prove malice.
Among the text writers Messrs. Odgers and Newell
deny that there is a privilege in the exercise of the right in
the sense in which that word "privilege" has been used, and
that actual malice on the part of the defendant must be
shown by the plaintiff before he can recover, basing this
assertion upon the case of Campbell v. Spotiswoode.
Their argument is that the words are not privileged by
reason of the occasion, as in the various classes of cases which
have been cited, but that the words are not defamatory, that
criticism is no libel. This is perfectly true so long as the act
alone is considered but it is absurd to maintain this position
and at the same time admit that imputations of motive may
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be made, for as we have endeavored to show, a criticism of
an act often contains an indirect slur upon the actor, while an
imputation of bad motive is a direct charge against him, which
certainly is defamatory.
Mr. Townshend also inclines to the view held by Mr.
Odgers, but his conclusion is logically consistent with this
view, for he denies the right of a critic to impute bad motives
to the author of the act criticised, unless he can prove that
his charges are true. Townshend on Slander and Libel, sec.,
256, p. 458, note 2.But as we have seen, and as Mr. Towflshend himself
admits, the cases do not support this proposition, however,
theoretically sound it may be.
Mr. Starkie on the other hand classifies this right and its
exercise under the cases of qualified privilege.
The two important cases which conflict with the view
held by Mr. Starkie are Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 F. & F.
421, 3 B. & S. 769, and Merivale v. Carson, L. R. 20 Q. B. D.
275, which latter being the latest English case on this subject,
must be taken as a statement of the law as it stands there
to-day.
The first case has already been discussed at lerigth, and.
no repetition of the facts is necessary. In his opinion upon
the rule for a new trial, Judge CROMPTON denies that there is a
privilege to the general public to comment on the public acts
of a public man provided the writer believes that what he is
writing is true. He says: "It is said that this belongs to the
class of privileged communications in which the malice of the
writer becomes a question for the jury, that is where, from the
particular circumstances or position in which a person is
placed, there is a legal or social duty in the nature of a private
or peculiar right, as opposed to the rights possessed by the
community at large, to assert what he believes. In these cases
of privilege there is an exemption from legal liability in the
absence of malice, and it is necessary to prove actual malice.
But there is is no such privilege here. It is the right of all
the Queen's subjects to discuss public matters, but no person
can have a right on that ground to publish what is defamatory
merely because he believes it true. If this were so a public
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man might have base motives imputed to him without having
an opportunity of righting himself. Therefore it is necessary
to confine privilege as the law has always confined it, to cases
of real necessity or duty, as that of a master giving a servant
a character, or of a person who has been robbed charging
another with robbing him;" and Judges BLACKBURN ahd
MELLOR appear to incline to this view as sound.
In Henwood v. Harrison, L. R., 7 C. P. 6o6, which was
decided nine years after Campbellv. Spotiswoode, the criticism
was treated as a privileged publication, while in Williams v.
Spowers, 8 Victorian L. R. (Australia) 82, the ques-
tion was directly decided, Judge HIGINBOTHAM saying: " The
question raised is, is this (criticism) a case of qualified privi-
lege within the legal meaning of the word ? and if this right
to discuss does come within the legal meaning of the word, is
it to be governed by the same rules of procedure and does it
raise for determination by the judge and jury the same ques-
tions of fact ?" And after carefully considering the decisions in
Campbell v. Spottiswoode,,he laid down an opposite rule and
decided that this was a case of qualified privilege and the rules
governing it and the questions to be decided by judge and
jury were the same as in the other cases.
In Merivale v. Carson, L. R, 20, Q. B. D. 275, the facts
were as follows: The plaintiff and his wife had written a play
called "The Whip Hand ;" the defendant was the editor of a
theatrical newspaper. The criticism complained of appeared
in the defendant's newspaper, and among other things it
referred to the play as a hash-up of matters which had been
used ad nauseam, a fatuous husband with a naughty wife.
The innuendo suggested was that the article implied that the
play was of an immoral tendency.
It was admitted that there was no adulterous wife in the
play. The judge charged: First.-Did the article bear the
plaintiff's reading? Second.-If it was a fair, temperate criti-
cism and did not bear that meaning, they must find for the
defendant. Third.-No malice is imputed to the defendant;
malice, if it existed, will be because the defendant has ex-
ceeded his right of criticism. Fourth.-If the article is no
more than fair, honest, independent, bold, even exaggerated
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criticism, the verdict should be ,fbr the defendant Fifth.-
The plaintiff must make out his case and satisfy the jury that
it is more than fair criticism.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs. The defend-
ants appealed, arguing: First.-That as this was a case of
privilege, express malice must be proved. Second-That an
article is not libellous provided it is a bondfide expression of
the writer's opinion. hird.-That the question of malice
was not properly left to the jury.
Lord EsHER, Master of the Rolls, in affiming the charge
and decision in the lower Court, says. in discussing the second
direction of the judge: "All the judges, both before and ever
since the case of Campbell v. Spotiswoode, have acted upon,
the view there expressed that a criticism upon a written pub-
lished work is not a privileged occasion."' He goes on to ex-
plain that a privileged occasion "is one in which the privi-
leged person is entitled to do something which' no one who
is not within the privilege is entitled to do, while in the case
of a criticism every person in the kingdom is entitled to do
and is forbidden to do exactly the same things."
"The jury are to decide whether the bounds of fair com-
ment have been exceeded, the question is, Is the article in the
opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man, however
prejudiced or however strong his opinion would be, would say
of the work in question ?"
Judge BOWEN agrees that criticism is not a case of privi-
lege, although he asserts that the question is rather
academical than practical.
In The Law Quarterly Review for April, i888, p. 240, Mr.
Pollock speaks of this case as voicing his own view on the
subject, i. e., that a fair criticism on matters of this kind is
not actionable, not because it is in the nature of a privi-
leged communication, but because it is not a libel at all.
Now if fair criticism is no libel, it follows that the motive
with which it is published is immaterial ; but it is unreasonable
to say that a fair criticism proved to have been made from
improper motives is not actionable, and Mr. Pollock himself
sees and endeavors unsuccessfully to explain this difficulty.
Pollock on Torts, 2d English edition, 231 note (j)..
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The basis of the argument in both the above cases
against the privilege is that the very meaning of " privilege "
is an immunity granted to one because of the existence of a
certain state of facts to do something which no one who is not
within the privilege can do, while in cases of criticism the right
extends to the public at large and may be exercised by anyone;
ergo, criticism is not privileged.
It seems almost incredible that the distinguished support-
ers of this view should be deceived by such an argument,
which is specious only because of a confusion of the two
uses of the word " privilege."
_A privilege in one sense may be defined to be a special
provision for a particular case out of the province of general
law, as for example the privilege of exemption from arrest
enjoyed by members of Parliament, and in our country by
members of Congress, and it is upon this meaning of the word
that the argurients in Campbell v. Spoutswoode and Merivale
v. Carson are based. But there is another use of the word,
entirely distinct from this, an example of which is to be found
in the Constitution of the United States, as follows: "The
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States," and the principal
of these privileges have been enumerated as protection by
the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, etc. Cor-
field v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 381.
Thus while privilege in its first meaning extends only to
a few, in its latter sense it covers all the inhabitants of a
country.
It is used in the latter sense in the expression "privileged
publications " and "the privilege allowed in the exercise of
the right of criticism," and has been defined to be an indul-
gence or immunity to a man in the honest exercise of a right,
in the free exercise of which the public have an interest. If
then the word is not used in the sense supposed by them the
whole reasoning of the judges in these cases falls.
The case of Campbell v. Spottiswoode apparently made a
radical change in the law. Merivale v. Carson affirmed the
former and laid down the law of England as it is to-day, but
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a careful consideration, will show that the change has only,
been one of phraseology and the principle has remained
unchanged.
The cases which hod that criticism is privileged say, you
have a privilege in the exercise of yofir right of criticism and
actual malice must be proved to deprive you of that privilege,
while bona fide belief in the truth of the criticism is sufficient
to entitle you to it, but to establish this actual malice it is
not necessary to prove a bad motive on your part, it is suffi-
cient to prove that you have made a statement which is so
groundless as to be in the eyes of the jury malicious, for if
this is found, it is utterly inconsistent with bona fides on your
part; as in the common law action of deceit for false state-
ments, reckless disregard of whether the statement made was
true or false, amounts in the eye of the law to -knowledge of
falsity, so in these cases the groundlessness of the charge
amounts in the eye of the law to actual malice.
Aerivale v. Carson lays down the principle that you have
no privilege, but you have a right of fair comment in common
with the rest of mankind. The jury decide what is fair com-
ment. If the comment is one which a reasonable man might
have made, no matter how prejudiced in his views, then they
must find for the defendant; if no reasonable man, however
prejudiced or strong his opinion, could have made this com-
ment, then they must find for the plaintiff, and the burden of
proving this unreasonableness is upon the plaintiff.
Is there any practical difference between these two classes
of cases, and is not the principle applied in this latter case one
and the same with that applied in such cases as Morrison v.
Belcher, supra p. 121, Hunter v. Sharpe, supra p. 121, and the-
rest, in which the privilege is claimed to exist?
Such surely is the wiser view, for any other would involve
an abridgement of the right of criticism, which is the great
weapon in the hands of the public by which abuses which can
be remedied in no other way are brought to the bar of public
opinion.
CHARLES COOPER TOWNSEND.
THE RIGHT OF CRITICISNI
Our parent country is slowly con-
ceding the right of criticism. Half a
century ago, the criticism of the con-
duct and motives of public men in
England and of the measures and
policy of the English government
would have exposed the writer to
fine and imprisonment. That govern-
ment for several centuries denied
to its subject the right of print-
ing tMat which had not its approval,
and it was to secure the right of the
citizen against the government's in-
terfering supervision that the pro-
vision guaranteeing the liberty of the
press has been incorporated into the
Bill of Rights of almost every one of
the United States: Negley v. Farrow,
6o Md.. 158, 176 (1883): Wason v.
Walter, L. R- 4 Q. B. 73 (1868).
The Constitution of Pennsylvania
is expressive of the general current
of State Constitutional law. Section
7 ef Article I provides-
" ihe printing press shall be free to
every pet'son who may undertake to
examine the proceedings of the Legis-
lature or any branch of government,
and no law shall ever be made to re-
strain the right thereof. The free
communication of thoughts and opin-
ions is one of the invaluable rights of
man; and every citizen may speak
freely, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty. No conviction shall be had,
in any prosecutions for the publica-
tion of papers relating to the official
conduct of officers, or men in public
capacity, or to any other matter proper
for public investigation or informa-
tion, where the fact that such publica-
tion was not maliciously or negligently
made, shall be established to the
satisfaction of the jury; and in all
indictments for libels, the jury shall
have the right to determine the law
and the facts, under the direction of
the Court as in other cases."
The last sentence of this section con-
tains a principle which previous to the
adoption of the Constitution in x873,
was unknown in *Pennsylvania. If
the matter complained of is proper for
publication, proof of malice or negli-
gence is essential to convict of the
offence.
In Barr v. Moore 87 Pa. 385, 392
(x878) the concluding sentenre of the
section of the Constitution, qu&ted
above, was involved in a civil suit for
libel ; but it was decided that the
clause "in no wise applies to a civil
action to recover damages . ..
It manifestly refers to the trial on an
indictment for libel." Briggs v. Gar-
rett, ixi Pa. 404, 411 (x886.)
The Pennsylvania Act of March 3r,
i86o, ? 24, provides : "If any person
shall write, print, publish or exhibit
any malicious or defamatory libel,
tending either to blacken the memory
of one who is dead, or the reputation
of one who is alive, and thereby ex-
posing him to public hatred, contempt
or ridicule, such person shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. This
section, however, is merely a codifica-
tion of the common law. Pittock and
dills v. O'Niell, 63 Pa. 253, 258 (i87o);
Barr v. Moore, 87 id. 385, 390, 391
(1878); ANeeb v. Hope, iii id. x45, i-5r
(x886) ; Briggs v. Garrett, id. 404, 419
(1886.)
In Neeb v. Hofie, suzrpa, TRUNKEY,
J., said: "Malice is said to be essen
tial to an action for libel, but it is
malice in a special and technical sense,
which exists in the absence of lawful
excuse, and where there may be no
spite or ill-will, or disposition to in-
jure others, Every publication hav-
ing the other qualities of a libel, if
wilful and unprivileged, is in law
malicious. The publication of words
actionable in themselves is sufficient
evidence of legal malice. Legal
malice exists where a wrongful act is
done intentionally."
Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 393
(1878). It is the duty of the Court
to determine whether a publication
is libellous. Ptltock and Mills v.
O'Niell, 63 Pa. 253, 257 (i87o). And
it is also to be determined by the
Court, as a matter of law, whether a
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communication is privileged or not.
If the communication be a privileged
one and is made in good faith, the
law does not imply malice, as in the
case of an ordinary libellous publica-
tion. If the communication is privi-
,leged, unless the plaintiff proves act-
ual malice, he cannot recover for
libel, and it is the duty of the Court
to grant a non-suit. But if the com-
munication contains expressions ex-
ceeding the limits of privilege, such
expressions are evidence of malice,
and the question is to be determined
by the jury. Neeb v. H-ope, ixu Pa.
145, x54 (N886); Briggs v. Garrett,
id. 404 (r886); Press Co. v. Stewart,
x19 id. 584 (I888). A communication
to be privileged must be made npon
a proper occasion, from a proper
motive, and must be based upon
reasonable or probable cause. PAX-
SON, J., in Briggs v. Garrett, supra ;
Press Co. v. Stewart, supira; Conroy
v. Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. 334, 338
(x89i).
The law in the several States is
practically the same. Malice is
deemed necessary to constitute slan-
der or libel. The law implies malice
in every case of defamation, but this
presumptive malice is rebuttable, and
the burden is then thrown upon the
plaintiff of proving actual or express
malice to warrant his recovery of
damages for the tort. It is because
there exists occasions when men must
speak freely their belief, though it be
wrong that the law allows an excuse,
and allows no redress for communica-
tions termed privileged, unless the
plaintiff proves actual malice.
This privilege is either absolute or
qualified. If the communication is
absolutely privileged, the plaintiff is
not permitted to show express malice,
and in no event can he, therefore, re-
ceive redress. Communications made
in judicial proceedings when relevant
to the issue on trial; in Legislative
proceedings when material to the
matter under consideration, and in
petitions to the Legislature presented
for proper purposes, are absolutely
privileged.
That a communication is prima
fade or qualifiedly privileged is a de-
fence which falls when the plaintiff
shows actual malice. In cases of
privileged communications it is in-
cumbent on the party complaining to
show malice. Proof of express malice
makes such a publication libelous;
and so if it is false or there is an ab-
sence of probable cause: Whkile v.
Nicholls, 3 Howard, 266 (x845).
Communications relating to matters
of a public nature are among the
class of prima facie privileged
communications. When a defamatory
communication is fairly made in the
discharge of some public duty. moral
or social, the occasion prevents the
inference of malice that the law ordi-
narily draws from such a communica-
tion, and affords a qualified defence,
depending on the absence of actual
malice. Thus language used in a
proceeding before a church organiza-
tion, if pertinent to the matter under
consideration, is privileged to the ex-
tent that unless plaintiff shows that
the defendant was actuated by actual
malice he is remediless: Yorkv. Pease,
2 Gray, 282 (1854); Farnsworth v.
Storrs, 5 Cush., 412 (i850) ; Shwitleff
v. Stevens 51 Vt. 501 (1879). It is
also permissible to report judicial
proceedings, and if not inaccurate,
and if free from defamatory comments
such a publication is primafacie priv-
ileged; but this does not apply to the
publication of a report of e-v parle
proceedings before an inferior Court:
Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake,
io Ohio St. 548; Matthews v.
Beach, 5 Sandf. 256. In Hayes v.
Press Co. 127 Pa. 642 (1889), a news-
paper published the fact that a judg-
ment had been entered against the
plaintiff, with a headline to the article
stating that he was "embarrassed."
STERREITT, J., said that "it was
a common. right of any one to pub-
lish the fact that ,a judgment
. . . . had been entered . .
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. . as shown by the record of the
Court in which it was entered; but it
was neither the right nor the privilege
of defendant, or any one else, to pub-
lish in connection therewith the dec-
laration, in the form of a headline, or
otherwise, that the defendants in the
judgment were embarrassed. See also
Edsall v. Brooks. 17 Abbott's Pr. 221
(z864) ; Godshalk v. Metzgar, 23
Weekly Notes of Cases 541 (Pa. 1889).
Communications made by way
of petition to the proper public
authorities for the redress of griev-
ances, are privileged, if made in good
faith and without malice. H'arris v.
Huntington, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 129 (1802);
Whitney v. Allen, 62 Ill. 472 (1872);
Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 23
(I8x5). In Larkin v. iVoonan, 19
Wis. 93 (1865) it was held that perti-
nent statements contained in a peti-
tion to the Governor for the removal
of a Sherifffrom office were privileged.
A public officer, whose removal was
occasioned by the false allegation of
misconduct justifying his removal
from office, contained, in a petition
addressed to the proper authorities,
cannot hold a signer of such a
memorial responsible for the false
statements to which he subscribed
without proof of express malice.
Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johnson, 508
(1809); Harwood v. Keech, 4 Hun.
389(0875). But if the complaint is false,
and is made without probable cause, it
is libelous. See anarsdale v.Laverly,
69 Pa. i3 (1871); Bodwell v. Osgood
20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 379 (1825); although
proof of falsity alone may not be suffi-
cient to warrant a recovery in the ab-
sence of affirmative proof of express
malice. Kent v. Bongarto, 15 R. I. 72
(x885); Smith v. Higgins, 82 Mass. 251
(x86o). In State v. Burnham, 9 N.
H. 34 (1837), PARKER, J., said, (p.
41, 42): "If the end to be attained is
justifiable, as, if the object is the re-
moval of an incompetent officer, or to
prevent the election of an unsuitable
person to office, or, generally, to give
useful information to the community,
or to those who have a right and
ought to know, in order that they
may act upon such information, the
occasion is lawful, and the party
may then justify or excuse the publi-
cation. Where, however, there, is
merely color of a lawful occasion and
the party, instead of acting in good
faith, assumes to act for some justifia-
ble end, merely as a pretence to pub-
lish and circulate defamatory matter,
or for other unlawful purpose, he is
liable in the same manner as if such
pretence had not been resorted to.
. . . There must be a lawful 'occa-
sion to excuse the speaking of de-
famatory words."
The case of Belknap v. Ball,
Supreme Court of Mich., decided
Dec. 24th, i89o, is a comparatively
recent case of importance on the
subject. Criticism is desrcibed by
GRANT, J., who delivered the opinion
of the Court in that case, to be a
"discussion, or, as applicable in libel
cases, a censure, of the conduct or
character or utterances of the person
criticised. When one becomes a can-
didate for public office, he thereby
deliberately places these before the
public for their discussion and consid-
eration."
In the State of New York it is held,
that although a defendant, honestly.
believes in the truth of what he alleges
derogatory to the public character of
an official, he has no more right to
make such a communication than he
would have if the plaintiff were a
private citizen: Lezis v. Pew, 5 John-
son i (i8o9); ing & Verplank v.
Root, 4 Wendell 113 (1829) ; Hunt v.
Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 (1857); Hamil-
ton v. Eno, 8I N. Y. r16 (i88o). See
czriticism of Lewis v. -Few, sup ra, in 23
Am. Law Reg. 23; 24 id. 645.
In King and Verplank v. Root, 4
Wendell 113 (1829), the editors of a
public paper published an article re-
presenting the Lieutenant-Governor
of a State as being beastly intoxicated
while in the discharge of his duties in
the Senate, and with outraging all
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order, decency and forbearance by
attempting to address the Senate in
that condition, and when he lkad no
more right to do it than any groveling
sot from the public kennel. WAL-
WORTH, Chan., said (p. x38): "It is,
however, insisted that this libel was a
privileged communication. If so, the
defendants were under no obligation
to prove the truth of the charge; and
the party libeled has no right to
recover unless he established malice
in fact, or showed that the editors
knew the charge to be false. The
effect of such a doctrine would be de-
plorable. Instead of protecting it
would destroy the freedom of the
press, if it were understood that an
editor could publish what he pleased
against candidates for office, without
being answerable for the truth of such
publications.
Hamillon v. Eno, 8r N. Y. ix6
(x88o) is the leading case in New
York on the subject. In that case
the plaintiff, who was a municipal
officer, in an official report,which was
published in a public journal, had
recommended a certain kind of pave-
ment. The defendant subsequently
caused to be published a communica-
tion alleging that the statements in
the plaintiff's report were made at
the dictation of those interested in the
pavement, for which the plaintiff was
rewarded. It was held that although
a criticism of the report, its reasoning
and conclusions, was permissible, the
occasion did not justify an attack,
such as this, upon the official's private
character, and in the absence of proof
establishing the truth of the accusa-
tions the defendant was responsible
for .the libel, notwithstanding his
motives may have been proper.
It is also the law in Massachusetts
that the truth of the charges must be
shown to exempt the defendant from
responsibility for criticising the char-
acter of a public man. In Common-
wealth v. Claf, 4 Mass. 163 (18oS),
PARKER, C.J., said: "Whenanyman
shall consent to be a candidate for a
public office conferred by the election
of the people, he must be considered
as putting his character in issue, so
far as it may respect his -fitness and
qualifications for the office. And pub-
lications of the trath on this subject,
with the honest intention of informing
the people, are not a libel. For it
would be unreasonable to conclude
that the publication of truths, which
it is the interestof the peopleto know,
should be an offence against their
laws, and every man holding a public
elective office may be considered as
within this principle.. . . The publi-
cation of falsehood and calumny
against public officers, or candidates
for public offices, is an offence most
dang-rous to the people, and deserves
punishment, because the people may
be deceived, and reject the best citi-
zens to their great injury, and it may
be to the loss of their liberty." This
language is referred to in White v.
Nicholls, 3 Howard 266, 290 (1845);
Commonwealth v. Mforris, z Virginia
Cases r76 (i8rz); see also Common-
wealth v. Odell, 3 Crumrine (Pitts.
Rep.) 449 (1867).
In Curtis v.Mussey, 72 Mass.(6 Gray)
261 (x856) the defendants published a
book containing a discourse delivered
during a canvass for an election of a
member of Congress upon the opinion
and decision of a Federal commis-
sioner remanding a fugitive from jus-
tice under the fugitive slave law, and
upon the expediency and constitu-
tionality of such a law, in which the
commissioner was accused of "legal
Jesuitism," of prejudice and want of
feeling, of "a partisan and ignoble
act," and comparing him to Pilate and
Judas; and it was held that the pub-
lication was not a privileged com-
munication, and as a matter of public
interest did not appear to be justified,
because the plaintiff was charged with
corrupt and improper motives and the
answer did not aver the truth of the
publication.
In Commonwealth v. W¢ardell, 136
Mass. 164 (883) the publication com-
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plained of charged the Sheriff with
being "an untruthful man," "a pro-
fane man, a libertine ;" with ruining
a young and innocent lady; "with
boasting of the influence of his office,
his money, and friends being suffic-
ient to crush any one who should at-
tempt to expose him;" and with
drawing "a pistol on a virtuous
Christian lady, in the presence of
men and women, for no cause other
than exposing him in a crime which
would send him to the State Prison as
a criminal." The Court held that
these charges related to the complain-
ant in his private and not in his official
capacity. COLBURN, J., said (p. z69):
"Whena person is in fact before the
public for re-election as a candidate
for an office, and especially during the
usual canvass which precedes an
election, we have no doubt that much
latitude should be allowed in publish-
ing, for the information of voters,
charges affecting the fitness of the
candidate for the office, on account of
moral character, and in holding the
occasion to be such as to render the
publication pbrima facie privileged.
But to hold that every person holding
an elective office, from the Governor
of the Commonwealth to a constable,
as soon as he enters upon the duties
of his office, if he does not disclaim
being a candidate for re-election, is
subject to have his moral character
assailed in any and every respect
which would disqualify him for the
office he holds, under the claim that
it is upon a privileged occasion, would
not tend to promote purity of elec-
tions, or the election to office of per-
sons of the requisite qualifications,
but would tend to induce all persons
having self-respect, and a desire to
lead a life of ordinary tranquility and
freedom from reproach, to decline to
hold, or be a candidate for, an elective
office."
In Seely v. Blair, Wright, Ohio,
358 (1833), the plaintiff, a candidate
for sheriff, was accused of perjury, and
in an action for slander, LANE, J.
charged the jury: "If one accuse
another of crime, he is presumed to
make a false accusation, and malice is
inferred from the falsehood. The
excuse or justification for speaking
must be proved by the defendant...
That the plaintiff was a candidate
for office, is no excuse for slandering
him. We have no right to tell a lie of
another because he is a candidate for
office, or is in office; though we may
speak th6 truth of him, we have no
right to bear false witness against our
neighbor. It would subvert our
government to allow the promulga-
tion of falsehood, which would drive
from office men who regard character,
and leave in only those without any."
In Brewer v. Weakley, 2 Overton,
Tenn. 99 (i8o7), the words spoken
of the plaintiff, who was a candidate
for the office of County Lieutenant,
Colonel Commandant, stated the con-
mission of misdemeanor for which he
was tried for his life. CAMPBELL, J.
said (p. io): "In relation to the loss
of the plaintiff's election, he ought not
to complain to a court ofjustice. The
nature of our government is such that
every citizen ought to be free to can-
vass the virtues, vices and talents of
any candidate for office, nor for any
thing that is said on such occasions
ought an action to lie." But POWELL,
J. was inclined to think that the
words were actionable in themselves
without aperquod. Banner Publish-
ing Co. V. State, x6.B. J. Lea 176
(1885).
In A'egly v. Farrow, 6o Md. 158
(1883), the plaintiff, a State Senator,
was charged in a newspaper with
being "under the influence and con-
trol of a corrupt democratic ring,"
and base and sordid motives were
imputed to him as governing his
official conduct. After declaring the
publication to be libelous Per se, the
Court,per Ro iNsoN, J., said (p. 176):
"It is insisted the defendants, as pro-
prietors of a newspaper, had the right
to criticise and censure the official
acts and conduct of the plaintiff as
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senator, and if the article in question
was published in good faith and With-
-out malice, honestly believing it to be
true, they are not liable for damages."
See also Rearick v. lWilcox, 81 Ill.
77 (1876).
In State v. Schmitt, 49 N. J. Law
(20 Vroom) 579, (1887), a newspaper
article published concerning an aspi-
rant for a post office appointment,
who had been a Congressman, stated
that a pension was procured by a
Congressman in a case of fraudulent
enlistment, and then used the follow-
ing language, alleged to be aimed at
the applicant for the public office:
"Up to date, President Cleveland has
not seen fit . . . to tie hungry
spoils hunters to the crib . . . who
have aimed to very doubtful pension
grants and anti-convict labor to catch
votes." It was held that this lan-
guage, being capable of construction
as charging a public representative
with intentionally pressing the pay-
ment of public money upon very
questionable claims, for the purpose
of influencing voters, was defamatory.
In Bailey v. Kalamazoo Publishing
Company, 40 Mich. 25r, (879), CAMP-
BELL, C. J., said (p. 257): "The
public are interested in knowing the
character of candidates for Congress,
and while no one can lawfully destroy
the reputation of a candidate by
falsehood, yet if an honest mistake is
made in an honest attempt to en-
lighten the public, it must reduce the
damages to a minimum if the fault
itself is not serious, and there should
be no unreasonable responsibility
where there is no actual malice."
This language is approvingly quoted
by CHAMPLIN, J., in Bronson v.
Bruce, 59 Mich. 467, 473 (x886).
Bronson v. Bruce, 59 Mich. 467,
(x886) it was decided that charges of
crime, which are false,made in a news-
paper against a candidate for Con-
gress, though made without malice
and in an honest belief of their truth,
are not privileged communications;
but if they are published in good
faith, after reasonable and proper in-
vestigation, this fact may go to miti-
gation of damages,
In Wheaton v. Beecler, 66 Mich.
307, 31o (x887), SHERWOOD, J., said:
"The libel in this case was not privi-
leged. It is true the plaintiff was a
candidate for appointment to the office
of Controller of the City of Detroit,,
but this did not license the dfendant,
or any other person, to villify, falsify,
and calumniate the character of the
plaintiff for honesty, integrity, and
morality." In Bourresean v. Detroit
Evening Journal, 30 Northwestern
Reporter 376 (1886), it was decided
that a newspaper article charging a
public officer with gross misconduct
in office is not privileged, on the
ground of its publication being a
public good; if untrue, it is libelous.
So in Foster v. Scribps, 39 Mich. 376
(r878), a publication that a physician
appointed by city councils has caused
the death of a patient by reckless
treatment was held to be not privi-
leged, and libelous, if false. In Hay
v. Reid, 48 Northwestern Reporter
5o7 (x8gi), a Michigan case, it was
held that words charging a Marshal
with misconduct in office, are not
privileged as being criticisms of his
official acts, and, if false, defendant
is responsible for their publication ;
and his belief in their truth at the time
of the publication can be shown only
in mitigation of damages and not in
justification.
The same rule is applied in Mis-
souri. Thus in Smith v. Burrus, x6
Southwestern Reporter 88x (July,
x891).
The cases in Wisconsin are to the
same effect. Thus in Wilson v.
Noonan, 35 Wis. 321 (1872), a publi-
cation charging a State Senator with
the offense of bribery was held not
to be privileged, and the defendant
is liable at least in compensatory
damages; but evidence is admissible
to show that the publication was not
made with any bad. motive or mali-
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cious intent, which is for the con-
sideration of the jury, in connec-
tion w'th the question of punitive
damages. See Kimball v. Fernandez,
41 Wi§. 329 (1877); Gollbehuet V.
Hubachek, 36 Wis. 5x5 (1875) ; Evison
v: Cramer, 47 Wis. 659 (1879).
Sqweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. i58,
(1878), is a leading case.
The plaintiff in this case was a can-
didate for the House of Delegates of
the State of WestVirginia, and it was
held that any allegations referring to
his mental and physical fitness for the
office he sought and which did not
refer to his moral character, however
harsh , and uncomplimentary they
were, were privileged and not the
basis of a libel suit.
The leading American cases deny-
ing any privilege if the publication
is false having been considered, those
cases holding a contrary view are next
to be noticed.
The leading case is that of Brggs
'v. Garrett, iii Pa. 404. In this case
the defendant, as chairman of a
voluntary association of citizens,
assuming to discuss the qualifications
of candidates for municipal offices,
stated, at a public meeting of the
association, at which newspaper
reporters were in attendance, that he
had -received a letter, addressed to
him in his official capacity, from a
reputable citizen and voter, charging
the plaintiff, who was a candidate for
re-election as Judge, with official mis-
conduct. The defendant then handed
the letter to the Secretary .of the
meeting, asking him to read it. The
letter was accordingly read aloud in
the presence and hearing of those
assembled, and afterwards appeared
in the newspapers. The charge con-
tained in the letter was absolutely
false, and at a subsequent meeting
the defendarn'as chairman, received
another communication from the same
writer, admitting his mistake; and
this letter was read in precisely the
same manner as the first one was
read.
In an action for libel the lower
Court held that the objectionable
letter came within the class of privi-
leged communications, in which
malice is not presumed; and as
no actual malice was proved upon
the trial, entered a non-suit. The
Supreme Court, through PAXsoN, J.,
affirmed this judgment.
Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N. H.
211, (x868), held that it was no libel to
allege in good faith and upon reason-
able grounds, the maladministration
of public affairs, and to accuse an
officer of official misconduct, for the
purpose of inducing a reform.
In Posnell v. Marble, 62 Vt. 481,
(1889), the defendant, in answer to an
inquiry from a post-office inspector in
reference to the plaintiff, who was an
applicantfor a post-office appointment,
in good faith and without actual
malice, made the communication
which was the subject of an action for
libel. MUNSON, J., said, (p. 488):
"The plaintiff was an applicant for
appointment to a public office. In
view of her application, her charac-
ter was a matter of public concern.
The defendant was a member of the
community, immediately interested in
the result of the application. Her
conversation was with one who she
might naturally suppose could prevent
the appointment. The circumstances
were such as to justify the defendant
in communicating what she honestly
believed as to the plaintiff's conduct
and character. .... .. But these
considerations disclose no necessity
for privilege broad enough to cover
charges which are unfounded and
malicious." See also Marks v. Baker,
28 Minn. 162, (1881). Compare Ald-
rich v. Press Printing Co., 9 Minn.
133, (1864)-
In Gove v. Blelhen, 21 Minn. 8o,
1874), it was decided that slanderous
words spoken of a person in an office
of profit, with reference to his official
character, imputing a charge of unfit-
ness, either in respect of morals o
capacity, for the duties of the office
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or want of integrity and corruption
therein, arE actionable per se, though
no crime is charged.
In Molt v. Dawson, 46 Iowa 533,
(1877), the plaintiff, who was a candi-
date for supervisor, was charged with
cheating the purchasers of cattle and
obtaining money by false pretenses,
and it was held that si~ch statements,
made to an elector shortly before
election, if made in good faith and
without malice, and with the honest
purpose of protecting the public from
the'plaintiff's supposed dishonesty,
being in the nature of a privileged
communication, was not actionable.
So in Bays v. Hunt, 6o Iowa 251,
255, (1882), it was held that an elector
who receives information concerning
alcandidate for office and believing in
its truth and without malice repeats
it to other electors for the sole pur-
pose of advising them of the real
character and qualifications of the
candidate for the office he was seek-
ing, is privileged in making such a
communication.
In State of JKansas v. Balch and
Watson, 31 Kansas 465, 472, (X884), the
defendants circulated an article
amongIthe voters of the county in
which they were electors, containing
statements untrue and derogatory to
the character of the prosecutor who
was then a candidate for the office of
county attorney; and it was held,
per VALENTINE, J., that "if the sup-
posed libelous article was circulated
only among the voters of Chase
County, and only for the purpose of
giving what the defendants believed
to be truthful information, and only
for the purpose of enabling such
voters to cast their ballots more intel-
ligently, and the whole thing was
done in good faith, we think the
article was privileged and the defen-
dants should have been acquitted,
although the principal matters con-
tained in the article were untrue in
fact and derogatory to the character
of the prosecuting witness."
See the case of Exfiress Printing Co.
v. Copeland, 64, Texas 354; 24 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 64o , (x885), decided
that when a person consents to be:
come a candidate for public office,
conferred by a popular election, he is
considered as putting his character
in issue, so far as respects his qualifi-
cations for the office, and whatever
pertains to such qualifications is a
legitimate subject for discussion and
comment; but statements and com-
plaints made must be confined to the
truth, or what, in good faith and-upon
probable cause, is believed to be true,
and the matter must relate to the
suitableness or unfitness of the can-
didate for office. WATTs, J., said,
(p. 644): "If the matter published be
true, and such as is justified by the
occasion, there could be no recovery
by the candidate against the pub-
lisher. If the matter is not justified
by the occasion, then the fact that
the person against whom it was di-
rected was at the time a candidate
for office, would not exempt the pub-
lisher from liability, whether the
matter published was true or false.
And although the matter published
might be justified by the occasion,
still, if it was false, a right of action
would accrue against the publisher, to
defeat which the burden would be
upon him to show that the publication
'was made in good faith, in the honest
belief of its truth, and besides that
there were just and reasonable
grounds for entertaining that belief."
In an action for slander and libel
the plaintiff, a candidate for Congress,
was described as possessing a weak
intellect, his mind having been im-
paired and weakened by disease;
though special damage was alleged,
yet upon demurrer it was held the
action was not maintainable though
the language used was false and
malicious-had a crime or moral de-
linquency been imputed an action
could have been sustained. In de-
livering the opinion of the Court,
NOTT, J., said: "When one becomes
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a candidate for public honors, he
makes proferl of himself for public
investigation. All his pretensions be-
come proper subjects of inquiry and
discussion. He makes himself a
species of public properly, into the
qualities of which every one has a
right to inquire, and of the fitness of
which every one has a right to judge
and give his opinions: "M .ayrant v.
Richardson, i Nott & McCord, (So.
Car.) 347, 350, (x8I8).
In Ramsey v. Cheek, r3 Southeast-
ern Reporter 775, (Nov., x89i), the
defendant wrote a letter to the Super-
intendent of the United States Census,
complaining that the census super-
visor had paid no attention to his
recommendations for enumerators,
but had appointed the plaintiff an
enumerator, a man who had since the
rebellion murdered two Union sol-
diers and been instrumental, in de-
frauding the defendant out of his
election to the Legislature. The an-
swer admitted that the defendant's
object was to secure the removal of
the plaintiff from office. The defen-
dant offered no evidence, and that of
the piaintiff showed the charges to be
untrue and his character good. It
was held that the case should have
gone to the jury, CLARK, J., saying:
"The present case is one of qualified
privilege. . . It was not absolutely
privileged. But he was an American
citizen, interested in the proper and
efficient administration of the public
service. He had, therefore the right.to
criticise public officers ; andif he hon-
estly and bona fide believed and had
probable cause to believe that the
character and conduct of the plaintiff
were such that the public interest de-
manded his remoVal, he had a right
to make the communication in ques-
tion, giving his reasons therefor to
the head of the department. The
presumption of law is that he acted
bona fide, and the burden was on the
plaintiff to show that he wrote the
letter with malice or without probable
cause.. .. There being evidence to
prove malice. . . his Honor erred in
not submitting the case to the jury.
If the defendant made the communi-
cation, not recklessly or nialicioisly,
but bona fide, and out of a desire to
benefit the public service, the plaintiff
cannot recover, though the charges
made by the defendant are untrue."
In 0ane v. W~aters, io F. R. 61g,
620, 1 (U. S. C. C. of Mass.),
z882, LOWELL, CircuitJ., said: "The
public has a right to discuss, in good
faith, the public conduct and qualifi-
cations of a public man, such as a
Judge, Ambassador, etc., with more
freedom than they can take-with a
private matter, or with the private
conduct of any one. In such dis-
cussions they are not held to prove
the exact truth of their statements,
and the soundness of their inferences,
provided they are not actuated by
express malice, and that there is
reasonable ground for their state-
ments or inferences, all of which is
for the jury." In this case the
publication of an article reflecting on
the character of the plaintiff, was
'justified upon the ground that he, as
the constructor and manager of rail-
roads, was concerned in a scheme of
constructing a railroad by the con-
solidation of certain short lines, and
sought to obtain control of a certain
railroad company by electing direc-
tors favorable to the scheme. LOWELL,
C. J., said, (p. 62r, 622): "Inasmuch
as the project was one which affected
a long line of road, as yet only partly
built, and the consolidationof several
companies, it assumes public impor-
tance. Perhaps the right of Legisla-
tive interference may be taken as a
fair test of the right of public discus-
sion, since they both depend upon
the same condition. The Legislature
cannot interfere in the purely private
affairs of a company, but it may con-
trol such of them as affect the public.
It cannot be doubted, I apprehend,
that the Legislatures of Connecticut
and Massachusetts would have power
to permit or to prohibit or to modify a
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scheme such as is now in question.
It interests the public, consisting of
the unascrtained persons who will
be asked to take shares in it, aid those
through whose land it will pass, or
whose business will be helped or hin-
dered by it, that such a line should be
well, and even that it should be honest-
ly laid out, built and carried through.
For this reason the character of the
plaintiff, as a constructor and mana-
ger of railroads, seems to me to be
open to public discussion when he
comes forward with so great and im-
portant a project, affecting many
interests besides those of the share-
holders of the road; and that, there-
fore, the defendants or any other per-
sons, have the qualified privilege
which attaches to discussing public
affairs." Compare ilson v. Fitch,
41 Cal. 363, (187).
The foregoing summary of the lead-
ing American decisions, abundantly
justifies the remark that they are
hopelessly irreconcilable. In Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, (5 Ed.)
Q44o, the distinguished author criti-
cises the assumption which many of
the decisions noted have made.
"That the private character of a public
officer is something aside from, and
not entering into or influencing his
public conduct; that a thoroughly
dishonest man may be a just minister,
and that a judge who is corrupt and
debauched in private life may be pure
and upright in his judgments; in other
words, that an evil tree is as likely as
any other to bring forth good fruits."
And he says: "Any such assumption
is false to human nature, and contra-
dictory to general experience; and
whatever the law may say, the general
public will still assume that a corrupt
life will influence public conduct, and
that a man who deals dishonestly with
his fellows, as individuals, will not
hesitate to defraud them in their
aggregate and corporate 'capacity, if
the opportunity shall be given him..
They are, therefore, interested in
knowing what is the character of their
public servants, and what sort of
persons are offering themselves for
their suffrages. And if this be so, it
iVould seem that there should be some
privilege of comment; that that privi-
lege could only be limited by good
faith and just intention; and that of
these it was the province of a jury to
judge, in view of the nature of the
charges made and the reasons which
existed for making them'"
The reasonable and correct doctrine
therefore seems to be that enunciated
in the leading cases of Briggs. v.
Garrett, ante p. 556, and Express
Printing Co v. Copeland, ante p. 563,
affirming the right of those interested
in the proper conduct of public affairs
to criticise in good faith and with
probable cause the conduct and quali-
fications of public officials and candi-
dates for public office. A qualified
privilege does exist, and though a
communication be false its falsity is
not proof of malice if the communi-
cation were justified by the occasion,
made with a proper motive, and
based upon reasonable or probable
cause.
ALFRED ROLAND HAIG.
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